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It is often claimed that natural language is in general compositional, in 
the sense that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the 
meanings of its constituent parts; or, to put this so-called principle of 
compositionality in other words, in the sense that an expression makes 
a uniform semantic contribution to all the compound expressions in 
which it is embedded. Thus formulated, the principle is rather vague, 
since its exact content depends on the sense of 'function of' or of 
'uniform semantic contribution,' as well as on one's understanding of 
the notion of meaning. Indeed, the principle, which is usually traced 
back to Frege, appeared in the literature in a variety of versions. 1 
An intuitive paradigmatical example of this yet ill-defined principle, 
is the relationship between an adjective-noun expression and its con- 
stituent adjective and noun. The English adjective 'red,' for example, is 
said to make the same contribution to the meaning of the expression 'a 
red bird,' 'a red chair,' and any other English sentence in which the 
word 'red' appears; excluding, of course, idioms and metaphors, and 
perhaps some other special cases. However, it is exactly this seemingly 
obvious case of compositionality, namely that of adjectives, which I 
would like to question in the present paper. I will argue that an 
examination of how adjectives behave in natural language reveals that 
their semantic contribution to the meaning of the whole in which they 
are embedded varies non-systematically across linguistic contexts. 
To see this, it is first necessary to make the notion of composi- 
tionality more precise. But since it is only adjectives that interest us 
here, it will suffice to characterize a notion of compositionality with 
respect to adjectives only, and in a sufficiently broad way so as to cover 
the majority of the common versions of the principle. 
As to the notion of 'meaning' which appears in the principle, I will 
leave it an open question what meanings are. For the present purpose, 
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we can use, instead of the problematic notions of meaning and semantic 
contributions, the notion of the applicability conditions of an adjective: 
the conditions that have to be satisfied by any object under any 
(correctly ascribed) noun in order for the adjective to correctly apply to 
that object; for example, the conditions under which an object is 
describable by 'red N,' for any noun N. After all, it is obvious that if 
two adjectives differ in their applicability conditions, then they also 
differ in their meaning (though perhaps not vice versa). Thus, instead of 
talking of 'a uniform semantic contribution,' we can interpret the 
principle broadly as requiring at least that every adjective has uniform 
applicability conditions in all the normal compound expressions in 
which it appears (excluding, of course special cases). Intuitively speak- 
ing, the idea is that the conditions that a table has to meet in order to 
be describable by 'red table' should be the same conditions that a house 
or a book has to meet in order to be describable by 'red house' or 'red 
book.' However, since the meaning of an expression may be context- 
dependent, the same should go for applicability conditions. The condi- 
tions that make something good or unique in one context should be 
allowed to be different from those that make something good or unique 
in another context, as long as there is a general rule for each adjective 
which specifies that context-dependency. Hence, by requiring that the 
applicability conditions of an adjective be uniform across all linguistic 
contexts, the principle should be understood as requiring that for every 
adjective there is a general function from contexts to applicability 
conditions. In that sense of a context-dependent notion of 'uniform,' the 
compositionality principle with respect to adjectives is the principle that 
every adjective has uniform applicability conditions across all com- 
pound expressions in which it is embedded. I take it that this formula- 
tion is broad enough to be accepted by most proponents of the 
different versions of the principle of compositionality. Intuitively, it says 
only that for any adjective there should be a general rule that specifies 
the conditions under which it can be applied to an object under a given 
noun. 
One motivation for the compositionality principle for natural lan- 
guage is that it allows for a theoretically elegant account of the seman- 
tics of compound expressions. Another consideration is based on the 
argument that compositionality is necessary for the learnability of 
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natural language. 2 However, in this paper I will not address directly any 
argument for compositionality. Instead, I will argue that as a matter of 
fact, adjectives behave in a non-compositional way. This will be, of 
course, an indirect challenge to such arguments. For, if the conclusion 
of an argument if false, then the argument cannot be sound. 
A P P L I C A B I L I T Y  C O N D I T I O N S  OF A D J E C T I V E S  
It is well known that the conditions under which many evaluative 
adjectives such as 'good' or 'beautiful' are applicable, depend on the 
noun to which the adjective is applied. What is beautiful for a girl is not 
beautiful for a tree, and what it is for a dog to be good differs from 
what it is for a couch or an apple to be good. 3 I do not refer here to 
another well known fact, that the applicability conditions of scalar 
adjectives, that is, ones which denote magnitudes such as 'long' or 'tall,' 
are scale-relative; that, for example, what is tall for a skyscraper is not 
tall for a man, and what is old for a turtle is not old for a car. What I 
have in mind is, rather, that different types of conditions, not just 
different magnitudes of the same condition, count towards the applica- 
bility of an adjective. A good knife, for example, is one that is sharp 
and is made of hard material, but a good man or a good apple is not 
sharper or blunter or made of a harder or softer material. 
Several writers have pointed out isolated examples of other, non- 
evaluative adjectives whose applicability conditions are also noun- 
dependent. Quine pointed out that a red apple is red on the outside 
while a pink grapefruit is pink on the inside, and Partee took that 
example to be similar to the case of 'flat' which applies differently in 
'flat tire,' 'flat beer' and 'flat note' (although it seems to me that it is 
more reasonable to regard the last two cases as mere metaphorical uses 
of 'flat'). 4 What is not sufficiently appreciated, however, and sometimes 
even denied, is that virtually all adjectives behave in much the same 
way, and there seems to be no one fixed set of criteria determining their 
applicability to different objects. Keenan and Faltz, for example, 
explicitly claim that color and shape adjectives are notre-independent. 5 
This, I think, is false, as the following examples will show. I should ask 
to be excused for the large number of examples that I give here. At the 
risk of being tedious, I intend them to demonstrate that the phenome- 
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non of noun-dependence applies to adjectives in general, and not just to 
isolated special cases. 
Consider the adjective 'red.' What it is for a bird to count as red is 
not the same as what it is for other kinds of objects to count as red. For 
a bird to be red (in the normal case), it should have most of the surface 
of its body red, though not its beak, legs, eyes, and of course its inner 
organs. Furthermore, the red color should be the bird's natural color, 
since we normally regard a bird as being 'really' red even if it is painted 
white all over. A kitchen table, on the other hand, is red even if it is 
only painted red, and even if its 'natural' color underneath the paint is, 
say, white. Moreover, for a table to be red only its upper surface needs 
to be red, but not necessarily its legs and its bottom surface. Similarly, a 
red apple, as Quine pointed out, needs to be red only on the outside, 
but a red hat needs to be red only in its external upper surface, a red 
crystal is red both inside and outside, and a red watermelon is red only 
inside. For a book to be red is for its cover but not necessarily for its 
inner pages to be mostly red, while for a newspaper to be red is for all 
of its pages to be red. For a house to be red is for its outside walls, but 
not necessarily its roof (and windows and door) to be mostly red, while 
a red car must be red in its external surface including its roof (but not 
its windows, wheels, bumper, etc.). A red star only needs to appear red 
from the earth, a red glaze needs to be red only after it is fired, and a 
red mist or a red powder are red not simply inside or outside. A red 
pen need not even have any red part (the ink may turn red only when 
in contact with the paper). In short, what counts for one type of thing to 
be red is not what counts for another. Of course, there is a feature that 
is common to all the things which count (non-metaphorically) as red, 
namely, that some part of them, or some item related to them, must 
appear wholly and literally redish. But that is only a very general 
necessary condition, and is far from being sufficient for a given object 
to count as red. 
Color adjectives are not special in the noun-dependence of their 
applicability conditions. First, to mention them again, evaluative adjec- 
tives like 'good' or 'pretty' apply differently to different objects. Second, 
in the case of adjectives which, like color predicates, denote physical 
properties, the part of the object relevant to the applicability of the 
adjective varies across types of objects. A blunt knife, for example, has 
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a blunt blade regardless of the bluntness of its handle, a fiat foot is flat 
in its bot tom surface, and a hot car has a hot engine (or, in other 
contexts, a hot interior) even though the rest of the car may be freezing 
cold. What is square in a square face are the contours of the chin, 
cheeks and forehead as they appear from the front, while a square 
house is square when looked at from above, and a square screwdriver 
has a square end. And third, there are many other adjectives that do 
not clearly fall under any particular category, which behave similarly. A 
slow animal is one which runs slowly, a slow student is one who grasps 
slowly, and a slow oven is one which cooks slowly. A tall man is tall 
regardless of whether he is standing or sitting or lying most of the time, 
while a tall building is tall only if it stands upright. A sad person is not 
distinguished by his intonation as is a sad voice, nor  does he need to 
refer to tragic events as does a sad story. And a strong man is not 
unbreakable like a strong metal bar, and does not blow forcefully as a 
strong wind does. This is not to deny that there are intimate connec- 
tions between the ways an adjective applies to different objects. It is 
only to say that despite the similarity, its applicability conditions differ 
considerably in different linguistic contexts. 
INAPPLICABILITY OF ADJECTIVES 
Not  only do adjectives apply differently to different objects, further- 
more, many adjectives do not apply to many objects at all. Thus, for 
example, there is no conventional condition under which the expres- 
sions 'a straight house,' 'a soft car,' or 'a quiet stone' are applicable; not 
to mention the more obvious cases in which the noun is abstract while 
the adjective is not, such as 'a tall love' or 'a red idea,' or vice versa, 'a 
gradual rat' or 'an intense tree.' Notice, that the point is not that houses 
are never straight or that trees are never intense in the same way that 
trees never breath or talk. Rather, we have no agreed upon conception 
of what it would be for a house to count - -  or to fail to count - -  as 
straight, or for a rat to be gradual. 
The fact that many adjectives lack conditions of applicability to some 
nouns, is well known. 6 But it is important to see that the reason for it is 
not that the meanings of the former are somehow inherently incon- 
gruent with the meanings of the latter, as in 'a square circle.' For  we can 
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easily imagine simple scripts in which a linguistic community associates 
non-metaphorical applicability conditions to many expressions which 
presently lack such conditions. In a community where the front halves 
of cars are made of varying material, and the softness of the material is 
regarded as important for safety and as a major factor in the value of 
the car, the expression 'a soft car' would naturally and literally denote 
cars whose front halves are made of soft materials. And in a world in 
which rats are constantly changing in appearance, but some change 
more abruptly than others, the expression 'a gradual rat' may be 
naturally applied to the latter. (And don't object that the meaning of the 
gradualness of a rat in this case is different from what 'gradual' 
normally means, since as we saw, there is no one simple, fixed meaning 
common to all applications of an adjective to begin with.) 
This implies that the reason that some adjectives do not have condi- 
tions of applicability to some nouns is not that there is some intrinsic 
incongruence between the individual meanings of the noun and the 
adjective, but simply because we have not had the occasion and 
interest to assign them applicability conditions. And this suggests again 
that the applicability conditions of an adjective are a patchwork of 
merely related, and not uniform, conditions. 
A P P L I C A B I L I T Y  C O N D I T I O N S  AND C O M P O S I T I O N A L I T Y  
The noun-dependence of the applicability of adjectives suggests, I think, 
that adjectives have non-compositional semantics, in the sense that their 
applicability conditions (and thus their semantic contribution to the 
expression in which they are embedded) varies from one linguistic 
context to another in a way that cannot be analyzed in terms of a 
general (not vacuously disjunctive) rule or function. However, the trans- 
ition from noun-dependence to non-compositionality is not a trivial 
step, and prima facie there is a natural way to try to avoid it: to absorb 
the noun-dependence into the meaning, and thus into the applicability 
conditions of the adjective. This way, the applicability conditions of an 
adjective would be dependent upon the linguistic context, but would 
not vary across linguistic contexts. 
One version of this idea, suggested by Partee, is to construe the 
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meaning of an adjective as an enumeration of the different ways it 
applies to different types of objects. 7 This view can be called the enum- 
erative analysis of adjectives. Alternatively, one may try -- as did Ziff, 
and later Fodor and Pylyshyn -- to capture the factors that determine 
the applicability conditions by making the meaning of an adjective sen- 
sitive not to the type of object to which it applies, but to the respect in 
which the object is most interesting or salientf The view can therefore 
be called the respectival analysis of adjectives. 
The problem with these two analyses is that even if correct, they 
would not help the cause of composifionality. They only push the threat 
of non-compositionality one step back. For it can readily be seen that 
just as an adjective does not have noun-independent applicability 
conditions, neither do the expressions that are used in the proposed 
analyses. The analyses therefore leave us with the same noun-depend- 
ence with which we started. 
1. The Respectival Analysis of Adjectives 
Let us first examine the respectival suggestion. As Fodor and Pylyshyn 
express the view: " 'Good NP' means something like NP that answers to 
the relevant interests in NPs: a good book is one that answers to our in- 
terest in books (viz. it's good to read); a good rest is one that answers to 
our interest in rests . . .  the meaning of 'good' is syncategormatic and 
has a variable in it for relevant in teres ts . . .  "9 
How should this analysis apply to other, non-evaluative adjectives? 
Perhaps it might be thought that 'red' means something like: red in the 
manner and in the parts whose color is most interesting or salient in 
this type of object. And 'square' means something like: approaching 
squareness to a larger extent than an average object of this type, with 
respect to its interesting or salient contours. 
That the prospects of this position are not great can be seen from the 
simple observation that 'salient' and 'interesting' are themselves adjec- 
tives, and as such are noun-dependent. Consequently, although it is 
hardly deniable that a red house is indeed red in a salient respect or in 
a respect that interests us, the conditions which make the color of a 
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house salient or interesting are different from the conditions which 
make the color of a crystal, pencil, or bird salient of interesting. The 
analysis therefore fails to provide applicability conditions that are 
uniform for different types of objects. 
More specifically, according to the suggested analysis, the reason red 
houses are red outside is that the color of their external surface is most 
interesting or salient. Now, the sense in which a red house is more 
saliently or interestingly red outside than inside, is that the red covers 
most of its external appearance, and thus captures the eye when the 
house is seen from the outside. However, a red crystal is not saliently or 
interestingly red in that same way. What makes a red crystal red is not 
just the sensory conspicuousness of its redness, since a crystal whose  
surface only is red -- or worse, which is painted red -- is not really a 
red crystal. Its color is salient or interesting probably in that it deter- 
mines its type or value. Red houses and red crystals are therefore 
saliently or interestingly red in different respects: the former in its 
sensory conspicuousness, while the latter in a more cognitive way, with 
respect to its geological significance. To try explain the difference 
between the redness of houses and the redness of crystals in terms of 
salience or interest therefore only transfers the problem of the multi- 
plicity of respects in which objects may be red to the multiplicity of 
respects in which objects may be salient or interesting. 
One might object that the difference between the redness of houses 
and that of crystals is not a difference in the respect in which the 
redness is salient or interesting, but only in the object of interest or 
salience. It is simply a result of the fact that different parts interest us in 
houses and in crystals. But that would not do. We are interested in the 
color of the interior of a house, that is, in the colors of its rooms, no 
less than we are interested in the color of its external surface. Neverthe- 
less the color of the inside of houses does not normally count towards 
the color of the house, whereas the color Of the inside of crystals does. 
Unlike the cases of houses and crystals, a red pen is red not because 
its redness is more conspicuous in its appearance, nor because of any 
geological or chemical interest in it, but because of our interest in its 
function: producing marks on paper. But on the other hand, a brush is 
not colorful even though its function is to lay colorful marks on 
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surfaces, and neither is a potion whose function is to enhance the 
greenness of plants necessarily green. 
The same phenomenon applies to other, non-color adjectives too. A 
square book is saliently or interestingly square in the sense of sensory 
conspicuousness; but a square house has many shapes that are not 
square, such as the shape of its external walls, which are much more 
conspicuous than its horizontal cross section. The squareness of a 
house depends, therefore, not on the pure sensory conspicuousness of 
its shape (unlike its color which is determined by pure sensory con- 
spicuousness), nor  on our interest in its function, but on some kind of 
architectural interest; which, it is worth noting, is not our everyday 
interest in houses. The strength of a wind is salient or interesting from 
the point of view of our interest in its effects, while the strength of a 
metal bar is salient or interesting from the point of view of our interest 
in its function, and a strong color is strong in the sense of some kind of 
sensory impression. Even the adjective 'good' does not mean answers 
our interests in that kind of object, as Ziff and later Fodor  and Pylyshyn 
suggest, since we are normally interested also in properties which do 
not count towards the goodness of the object. A pornographic book 
might answer some of our interests in books although we would not 
regard it as a good book, and an ancient golden knife might answer our 
interest in cutlery although, being dull, it would not be regarded as a 
good knife. 
More generally, just as there is no unitary respect in which all red 
objects are red, there is no reason to expect that there is a unitary 
respect in which all salient or interesting things are salient or interesting. 
For  one thing, different types of interest and salience often conflict with 
each other, and these conflicts are resolved in different ways for 
different types of objects. Furthermore,  in many cases it is not even 
clear what type of interest or salience it is which picks out the object's 
relevant respect. The contours which make a round face round, for 
example, are clearly not salient or interesting in any functional sense, 
nor are they more conspicuous in appearance than the profile's 
contours; and it is far from clear what type of salience or interest 
determines that a man is fat if his belly rather than his face or legs are 
fat. 
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Thus, analyzing adjectives in terms of interest or salience cannot 
help get rid of the problem of noun-dependence, since what counts as 
salient or interesting is different for different objects no less than what 
counts as red or square. 
2. The Enumerative Analysis of Adjectives 
A similar problem applies to the second of the above mentioned 
analyses, in terms of enumerative meanings: it uses an expression that is 
no less noun-dependent than the analyzed adjective itself. 
The basic idea of the enumerative analysis is that to apply an 
adjective to an object is to say that depending upon the type of object 
in question, a certain specified aspect of the object (e.g. its shape, or its 
function, its part, its environment) has some specified property. 1~ The 
adjective 'red,' for example, is analyzed as meaning something like: 
having an external surface which is red if it is a non-transparent solid 
inanimate object, having a red inner volume if it is a fruit whose inside 
only is edible, etc. 
Note that the adjective 'red' is analyzed here in terms of redness (of 
various parts of the object). But that should not be seen as a problem. 
For, the redness that is mentioned in the analysans can be construed as 
redness in some restricted, unitary sense, which does not vary from 
object to object. Specifically, since it seems that every red object is red 
in some surface and/or  in some volume in it or pertaining to it, we can 
analyze all 'red' occurrences in terms of this restricted redness --  
redness in the sense in which a surface or a volume is red. Using the 
notion of primitively red for this sense of redness, a more precise 
formulation of the enumerative analysis of 'red' would be something 
like: having an external surface which is primitively red if it is a non- 
transparent solid inanimate object, having a primitively red inside if it is 
a fruit whose inside only is edible, etc, 
The same should be applicable to other adjectives. To say that 
something is square, for example, is to say that the contours of its 
functional part are primitively square if it is a tool, that its contours as 
seen from above are primitively square if its is a building, and so on. 
And since the way in which an object's surface or volume is primitively 
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red does not differ from object to object, it might seem that the analysis 
does indeed get rid of the noun-dependence of adjectives which 
threatens compositionality. 
However, a closer look will reveal that this not the case. For there is 
another problematic expression that is used in the suggested analysans. 
If, as we saw, the idea is to explain away the noun-dependence by 
analyzing an adjective as meaning something like: having an aspect 
which is primitively A if the object is a B . . . ,  then the formulation of 
the analysans will necessarily consist of an expression denoting an 
aspect-of relation between the object and its aspect: 'the surface of an 
object,' 'an object having a blade which . . .  ,' 'its function is . . .  ,' 'the 
object's contours a r e . . .  ,' 'an object whose environment i s . . .  ' In fact, 
since, as we saw, many analysans must be rather complex, it is clear that 
in many of them several aspect-of expressions will be used, for 
example, 'having walls whose external surface i s . . . '  
But now, the problem is that the applicability conditions of aspect-of 
expressions -- 'of,' 'having' 'its' 'whose,' and their equivalents --  are 
noun-dependent no less than the applicability conditions of the 
analyzed adjective itself. And if so, then what it is for one thing to be of 
another thing differs from object to object, no less than what it is for 
something to be describable by 'red' or 'square.' All that the proposed 
analysis manages to do is push the problem of noun-dependence one 
step further. 
To see this, consider, for example, the expression 'has a primitively 
red external surface,' which is presumably supposed to be used in the 
analysis of 'red.' Since I am not concerned here with the composi- 
tionality of nouns such as 'surface,' we may grant, for the sake of the 
argument, that there are uniform conditions which make something 
count as a surface, or even as an external surface. The question arises, 
however, what it is that makes a given surface the surface of some given 
object, rather than that of another. After all, there are many surfaces, 
and even external surfaces, in the world, including a great number of 
them in any given object. To take the example of a bird, the surface of 
the bird's beak, of its kidneys, of it feathers, and of its brain -- not to 
mention surfaces in the bird's environment --  are all surfaces, and even 
external ones. But although they are in the bird's body, they do not 
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count as the external surfaces of the bird, but rather as those of its 
kidney, feather, brain. In virtue of what conditions is a given surface the 
surface of, say, the kidney, and not of the bird? 
Now, the answer to that question should specify the general condi- 
tions for of-ness relations between any two items, and not only between 
birds and their surfaces. For, as we saw, an aspect-of expression is 
supposed to be used in virtually every analysis of an adjective. The 
analysis will therefore help the cause of compositionality only if 
aspect-of expressions behave more nicely than adjectives; which is to 
say, only if what it is for one object to be of another is not different for 
different types of objects, as is what it is for an object to be red or 
square. 
But now, if we examine the conditions under which one object 
counts as being of, or being had by, another, we discover that what it is 
to have one type of object is different from what it is to have another 
type of object. And that should not be surprising. For although 
aspect-of expressions are, grammatically speaking, not adjectives but 
rather prepositions ('of') or verbs ('have'), they are similar to adjectives 
in their function, in that they express a predicate which applies to 
objects. 
Consider, for example, what it is for something to be of a bird. For a 
surface or a bottom to count as being of a bird, it must be part of the 
bird's body; but a behavior or a nest or a mate of a bird need not. 
Furthermore, even being part of the bird's body is not a sufficient 
condition for the bird's surface or bottom, since not every surface or 
bottom in the bird's body is the bird's surface or bottom. As we saw, a 
surface or a bottom in a bird may be the beak's or the kidney's. As a 
matter of fact, if we allow science-fiction-like cases, it is not even 
enough for a feather or a leg to be part of the bird's body in order for 
them to count as the bird's feather or leg. Some birds may have body 
cells with tiny feathers, or corpuscles which move around in their blood 
stream with the help of tiny legs. Clearly, although these would be parts 
of the bird's body, they would not be the bird's feathers or legs. Note 
that it is not the fact that these object are too small or too deep inside 
the bird that disqualifies them from being the bird's. Lungs, for 
example, are the bird's lungs even though they are inside the bird's 
body, and so are body cells, even though they are microscopic. 
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Similarly, if a table is made of (a bird's) wings or (a zebra's) hide, 
that does not make any part of the table the table's wings or the table's 
hide. The wipers' motor in a car is not the car's motor, and a tail does 
not become my tail if I swallow it. Not every wall in a house is the 
house's wall, and not every shape in a face is the face's shape. In order 
for something to count as a leg or a head or a wall of an object, it has 
to serve a function specific for the object, or to be situated in the right 
place in it, or to be connected in the right way to other parts of the 
object, or in general to satisfy various conditions which vary from 
object to object. The situation is even worse for aspect-of relationship 
to aspects that are not parts. It is hard to see anything in common 
between the of-ness relationships in the case of the function of a knife, 
the job of a person, his birthday, his friend, and his weight. 
It seems, therefore, that whether one object counts as being of 
another object depends on what type of object they are. And what this 
means is that the attempt to analyze adjective-noun expressions in 
terms of aspects of objects cannot eliminate the noun-dependence of 
applicability conditions. What it is for an object to be describable by 
'red' differs for different objects no less than what it is for an object to 
have a primitively red surface, or primitively square contours. 
N O U N - D E P E N D E N C E  A N D  N A T U R A L  L A N G U A G E  A N A L Y S I S  
What all this suggests is that neither the enumerative nor the respectival 
analyses of adjectives can save compositionality from the problem of 
the noun-dependence of adjectives. What they both do is transfer the 
noun-dependence of the analyzed adjective to the noun-dependence of 
the expressions used in the proposed analysans, and thus leave us with 
the same threat to compositionality with which we started. Is there then 
some other way to save compositionality? A partial answer is that at the 
very least it seems that no analysis that captures the meaning of 
adjectives by using natural language expressions can do the job. For, 
any such natural language expression should comprise no aspect-of 
expression, no underspecified interest- or salience-adjectives, and more 
generally no adjective that applies non-primitively to an object. And as 
far as I can see, no plausible analysis is possible under these restrictions. 
One might be tempted to think that an analysis of adjectives that uses 
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only nouns and verbs might be possible. But this suggestion does not 
seem to work. One reason for this is that nouns and verbs are not suffi- 
cient to capture the meaning of many adjectives. How can one analyze 
what it is for an object to be red or square without using either adjec- 
tives or aspect-of expressions? Of course, you can define new nouns or 
verbs which will capture the meaning of an adjective, for example, 
define 'a redder '  as meaning: an object which is red. But then, the appli- 
cability conditions of such newly defined expressions will inevitably 
inherit noun-dependence from the expressions used in their definition. 
Another  reason why this suggestion would not work is that at least 
many verbs are as noun-dependent  as adjectives. For  a hat to be ruined 
is for it to have unremovable stains or holes or wrinkles, unlike what it is 
for a clock or a city to be ruined. Giving someone a glass of water 
involves handing it without necessarily transferring ownership, unlike 
giving someone a house or an idea or a name. Opening a door  is moving 
it to uncover an opening which it hides, while opening a box is moving 
only a part of it to uncover a hollow inside it, and opening a newspaper is 
spreading its pages, unlike opening a fruit or an eye or a wound. 
It must be admitted that there are a number of verbs which at least 
on the surface do not seem to display noun-dependence.  The verb 
'walk,' so it seems, applies to anything that moves on its legs on the 
solid ground, and the verb 'eat' applies to anything that inserts food 
through its mouth into its digestive system. The same is true for many 
other verbs denoting human actions. However,  it is important to note 
that what is common to the applicability conditions of such verbs is that 
they are defined in terms of various functionally characterized organs of 
the agent. Indeed, when we encounter expressions such as 'the tree 
walked,' or  'the tree talked,' the only way to make sense of them is to 
assume that the tree has the relevant organs, namely, legs in the first 
case and a mouth in the second. But if this is so, and the applicability 
conditions of such verbs are defined in terms of parts or aspects of the 
object, then we are back to the problem of noun-dependence of aspect- 
of expressions. Since the aspect-of relationship is not a uniform 
relationship, verbs which are defined in terms of it do not have uniform 
applicability conditions either. Thus, the recourse to verbs not only fails 
to help compositionality, it even makes it worse, by suggesting that 
noun-dependence applies to verbs too. 
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What remains of the suggestion to analyze adjectives by using only 
compositionally behaving expressions, is that the analysis can use only 
nouns, and the very few adjectives and verbs that might prove to be an 
exception to the noun-dependence rule. But those seem to be hardly 
enough resources for carrying out such a comprehensive analysis of all 
the adjectives and verbs in natural language. There does not seem to be 
any way to analyze what it is for an object to be red or square without 
using adjectives, verbs, or aspect-of relationships. 
E X P E L L I N G  N O U N - D E P E N D E N C E  F R O M  S E M A N T I C S  
At this point, it might be tempting to think that if the noun-dependence 
of adjectives cannot be eliminated, then it can at least be made harmless 
to the principle of compositionality, by viewing it as belonging to the 
pragmatics of adjectives, and not to their semantics. An adjective such 
as 'red,' according to this idea, means something like what I called 
'primitively red'; that is, red in the way that only a small number of 
objects are red, presumably red surfaces or red volumes. Strictly 
speaking, therefore, only surfaces and transparent bodies can be red. 
All other objects which in ordinary language we call 'red' -- what we 
call 'red apples,' 'red books,' etc. -- are not really red. We call them so 
for various pragmatical reasons, but strictly speaking, inaccurately and 
falsely. The case can be compared to that of the expression 'there are a 
thousand people in the audience.' The fact that we often use this 
expression for audiences that we know are only roughly of a thousand 
people, does not mean that 'a thousand' means roughly a thousand. It is 
therefore not part of the semantics of an adjective that we apply it 
differently to different objects, and so noun-dependence is not a 
counterexample to the principle of compositionality. 
One problem with this suggestion is that if it is to be more than a 
vacuous trick, a reason has to be given for why so many sentences that 
we ordinarily take to be true should be viewed as being really inaccu- 
rate and false. The presumption should be that what speakers who are 
in command of the facts take to be true is true, unless shown otherwise. 
And I can see no good way of showing this in the case of adjectives. In 
particular, the familiar argument that compositionality is required for 
the learnability of language will not help here. The learnability of the 
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problematic behavior of 'red' will not be explained merely by calling it 
pragmatics rather than semantics. 
Furthermore, on the face of it, the suggestion seems rather implausi- 
ble. When we use an expression such as 'there are a thousand people in 
the audience' in a way that is strictly speaking false or inaccurate, there 
must be room for greater accuracy. One can, for example, ask the 
speaker to be more precise. But there seems to be no parallel in the 
case of adjectives. If someone describes a car as red or a knife as sharp, 
then it makes no sense to ask him to be more precise about the way in 
which it is red or sharp (although it makes sense to ask him to be more 
precise about magnitudes: the exact shade of red, or the degree of 
sharpness). In fact, if after describing his knife as sharp the speaker 
adds 'more precisely, the sharpness of my knife is only in its blade, not 
in its handle,' then that will be accepted at most as a joke. And if there 
is no room for greater accuracy in the use of the adjective, then no 
inaccuracy has been there in the first place. 
Moreover, when a sentence, such as 'there are a thousand people in 
the audience,' is used inaccurately and strictly speaking falsely, the 
hearer can complain that it was misleading. But again, there seems to be 
no parallel in the case of adjectives. If I tell someone that my knife is 
sharp, and the hearer, upon seizing the knife, disappointedly complains 
that I misled him into thinking that the handle of the knife is sharp too, 
we would ordinarily say that he simply does not understand what 'sharp 
knife' means. 
For these reasons, it seems that the noun-dependence of the 
applicability of adjectives is due to their meaning, and not to the 
inaccurate way in which we apply them. Admittedly, I rely here on our 
ordinary linguistic intuitions, which need not be infallible. But until 
some good reason is given for rejecting them, the idea of banishing 
noun-dependence to pragmatics seems to be unacceptable. 
C O N C L U S I O N  
All this is not intended to be a knock-down argument against the 
compositionality principle, but only to show that the common ap- 
proaches which are often used to support it are unsatisfactory. This 
leaves open the possibility that the principle could be defended in some 
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other way. But as far as I can see, that is possible, if at all, only at the 
price of ad hoc, unmotivated, or implausible claims. 
Specifically, at least three defenses of the principle seem to be still 
open. First, it might be thought that adjectives in different contexts can 
be regarded as distinct words with different meanings, so that the lack 
of uniformity between their applicability is no longer embarrassing. 
'Red' in 'red house' and 'red' in 'red apple' are simply two distinct 
words. Second, it might be thought that even though the uniform appli- 
cability conditions (and meaning) of an adjective cannot be 
satisfactorily analyzed by using natural language expressions, they might 
still be analyzable in theoretical terms. The common element between 
all the applicability conditions of an adjective would then be regarded 
as a theoretical posit, presumably some theoretically specifiable pro- 
perty. And third, the common element between the applicability 
conditions of an adjective can be construed as a primitive which is 
properly analyzable neither in theoretical nor in natural language terms. 
It remains to be investigated whether any of these approaches, and 
possibly others, can work. But it seems to me that none of them is very 
appealing. The first position is especially implausible, since it seems to 
contradict the obvious fact that the meanings of an adjective across 
normal linguistic contexts are intimately related. And if the word 'red' 
in one context is a different word from 'red' in another, then it is 
unclear how this intimate semantic relationship can be explained. 
Furthermore, the position also seems to make the learnability of 
language --  the speaker's ability to use his understanding of one 'red' to 
gain understanding of another 'red' --  unexplainable by composi- 
tionality alone; which undermines one of the main motivations for the 
compositionality principle. 
As to the other two alternatives for rescuing compositionality, they 
have the burden of explaining why, if adjectives do have uniform 
applicability conditions, these conditions systematically escape analysis 
in natural language terms. Furthermore, if compositionality is to help 
explain the learnability of natural language, then it has to be assumed 
that the speaker somehow uses the alleged uniform applicability condi- 
tions as criteria for the use of adjectives. But then it is rather mysterious 
why despite the speaker's mastery of such (alleged) uniform criteria, his 
natural language resources are systematically insufficient to provide a 
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uniform characterization of these criteria. It seems more plausible that 
there simply are no such criteria. 
Further discussion is needed to evaluate the plausibility of these 
positions. But the moral of the discussion is that in any case, com- 
positional meanings of adjectives, even if there are such, can no longer 
be accounted for in a straightforward way, as simple, isolable semantic 
building blocks, as it might be tempting to view them. A much more 
complicated account is required. Indeed, it is my opinion that unless 
one is willing to believe in such bizarre monsters as adjectives that are 
individuated by their linguistic contexts, or primitive applicability con- 
ditions, adjectives should be construed as having a non-compositional 
semantics. While the applicability conditions and thus the meanings of 
an expression in different linguistic contexts ordinarily have a uniform 
context-independent element, they also have a surprisingly large com- 
ponent that differs non-systematically from context to context. 
But there is another prima facie reason against those rather forced 
defenses of the principle of compositionality. Psychologically speaking, 
it seems quite clear what the cognizer does when applying an adjective 
in a newly encountered linguistic context: he uses analogies or similarity 
relationships to go from familiar linguistic contexts to new ones. One 
can figure out that, for example, a red box is red outside by making an 
analogy -- and not a trivial one --  to red houses and balls, but not to 
red crystals or watermelons. But now, it seems that nowhere in this 
psychological story is there any room for a uniform mental state which 
is the apprehension of the applicability conditions of 'red.' The speaker 
does not seem to use, psychologically speaking, any single criterion for 
applying 'red.' Now, of course, there is no automatic translation of 
psychological stories to semantic theories. But it seems that some 
strong parallel should exist between the two. And if so, then it seems 
reasonable to expect that what makes a red box or crystal or water- 
melon red is something that has to do with a network of similarity 
relationships to paradigmatical cases, and not with some unitary 
semantic unit. This is of course not a conclusive argument. But it 
suggests that an account of the semantics of adjectives based on family 
resemblance or similarity relationships, instead of on compositionally 
behaving fixed semantic building blocks, might prove better for dealing 
with the noun-dependence of adjectives. 
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